

ER 11-2787-b

15 April 1959

Card
Admiral Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Arleigh:

We have read Admiral Flaherty's letter with a great deal of interest, and found his comments provocative and stimulating.

As to the matter of jamming Soviet Arabic language broadcasts, this would prove a very difficult proposition, certainly a costly one. However, most of the receiving sets in the area are of the medium wave variety, and while the Communist broadcasts undoubtedly have a fairly high impact, their audience is more restricted than one might think. We are exploring the jamming problem.

Faithfully,

SIGNED

10

SA/CNE: [redacted] EX April 1959 Allen W. Dulles
Retyped: DCI/ji (15 April 1959) Director

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
(EXECUTIVE SECRETARY)

Harry

STAT

25X1

SECRET



10 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : *A/*Deputy Director (Plans) *mt*

SUBJECT : Reply to letter from Admiral Arleigh Burke,
Chief of Naval Operations

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for action by the DCI, such recommendation appears in Paragraph 3.

2. Attached for your approval is the draft of a reply from yourself to a letter from Admiral Arleigh Burke, dated 31 March 1959, which quotes in extenso, a letter to Admiral Burke from Rear Admiral M. F. D. Flaherty, COMIDEASTFOR.

3. Should the attached letter meet with your approval, it is recommended that it be sent to Admiral Burke.



Chief
Near East and
South Asia Division

1 Attachment

cc: DDCI

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

25X1

NO.

DATE

15 April 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DCI

REFERENCE

2.

3.

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Executive Registry
11-27877

**Admiral Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.**

Dear Arleigh:

I have read Admiral Flaherty's letter with a great deal of interest. I found his comments provocative and stimulating.

We are very much in agreement here with Admiral Flaherty's observation on Nasser's appeal to the Arab world, the extent to which Iraq threatens to damage his prestige and on the fact that to back Nasser too overtly and too directly in his fight against Communism could prove counterproductive in the long run. It certainly follows from this that the improvement of our relations with the USSR is very much in our interests.

As to the matter of jamming Soviet Arabic language broadcasts, I am told that this would prove a very difficult proposition, certainly a costly one. However, most of the receiving sets in the area are of the medium wave variety, and while the Communist broadcasts undoubtedly have a fairly high impact, their audience is more restricted than one might think. We are exploring the

[Redacted]

25X1

With reference to Admiral Flaherty's comment on the Arab-Israeli problem, I concur with his view that it is far from solved and that it contributes very greatly to the political instability of the entire area. At the moment, the problem appears to be less urgent than it was and it may be that the Israelis and

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Arabs will learn to live amicably with one another.

Admiral Flaherty's final observation on the significance of a Communist-dominated Iraq is one with which I agree wholeheartedly. I am not so sure that the Berlin crisis is a screen to cover Communist intentions in the Middle East, or even a diversionary attack. I am more inclined to think of this as two major Communist offensives on separate fronts.

With warmest regards.

Faithfully,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Director
(Plans)

SA/CNE: [Redacted] 19 April 1959

Distribution:

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~~SECRET~~

W. B. Dulles
CNE



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Admiral Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

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Allen W. Dulles
Director